In this contribution the question is asked, and tried to be answered, which form of accountable government the European Union should have in the future. The subject may seem to be of a speculative nature and, indeed, it is. However, complaints are often heard that political decisions are taken, jumping from one crisis situation to another, ending up in a political structure without any consistency. Consequently, it may be desirable to think about how a coherent political structure of the EU may look like. Surely, many will think that this is preposterous now that a constitution for Europe has been rejected. But, is it not exactly when the political decision making process has come to an halt and limiting itself, as it usually does, to taking punctual decisions in order to resolve daily problems, that some long term academic thinking is appropriate? That is what I intend to do herein, dividing my lecture in three parts: first, which proto-type forms of accountable government are available in democratic states, second, which form is preferable from a theoretical point of view, and third, what would be the most appropriate form of accountable government for the EU from a practical viewpoint. The whole exercise is about making the Union's structure more democratic, and the Union's decision making process more legitimate.
to assuming responsibility for wrongful acts, and creating liability to repair the prejudice caused thereby to others, through remedies such as compensation or restitution.
Political accountability (in its two meanings) is an essential characteristic of democratic government in that it refers to the organisation of public power in a democratic fashion, that is, in a way that makes government answerable to the people. It goes hand in hand with good governance which concerns the exercise of public power in the pursuit of the public good and justice for all. Both, democratic government and good governance, entail respect for the rule of law and due process, that is, submission of public authority to judicial review by an independent judge and compliance with proper procedures. They also require an open and transparent government, responsible citizens and civil servants and a vibrant civil society and public opinion initiated and stimulated by responsible media. As mentioned, this contribution focuses on political accountability and political responsibility, not on the rule of law or responsibility for illegal or wrongful behaviour, or on any of the other characteristics of democratic government, just mentioned. 1 executive, and the judiciary as directly enforceable law. Finally, and most important in a context of European constitution making, the Basic Law deals with the difficult problem of delineating federal and national legislative and executive powers, and installs a constitutional court empowered to both adjudicate disputes concerning the interpretation or application of constitutional provisions, and to protect the basic rights of individuals. 6 It is not a two party system but a multi-party system which normally necessitates the participation of at least two parties in government which therefore is a coalition government. All these aspects show that, at first glance, the German system looks like a more suitable model for the European Union than the British or, as we will see, the French.
Although the Federal Republic of Germany has a Federal Chancellor, rather than a Prime
Minister, the German constitutional structure strongly resembles the British parliamentary system. Both the British Prime Minister and the German Chancellor are the leader, in name or in fact, of the political party that won the elections, and so have the ability to choose their cabinet, mainly from fellow members of Parliament. They also set general policy with the help of their cabinet and are, with their cabinet, accountable and politically responsible for governmental conduct towards Parliament. Both need the support of a majority in parliament and would have to step down, together with their cabinet, if they were to lose the confidence of parliament, that is, of the majority in Parliament that supports the government. As pointed out above, since in the United Kingdom, this majority is made up of members who belong to the Prime Minister's own political party, the British Prime Minister has de facto a more solid position than the German Chancellor whose majority is normally made up of members of Parliament of different political parties that have formed a coalition to support the incumbent government.
The impact of the latter difference is reduced, however, by the fact that Article 67 of the German Basic Law provides in a so-called "constructive vote of no confidence" -according to which the Bundestag may express its lack of confidence in the Chancellor only by electing a successor with the majority of its members. If no majority for such a constructive vote of no confidence can be found, the President may, upon the proposal of the incumbent Chancellor, dissolve the Bundestag within twenty-one days. 7 Obviously, the system reinforces the Chancellor's position considerably, as it is more difficult to bring together a positive majority to agree on the new chancellor, than to assemble a negative majority to oust the government.
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B. The U.S Presidential and the French Semi-Presidential systems.
In 1776, thirteen English colonies signed the American Declaration of Independence, and ratified in 1781, after a peace treaty with England was signed, the Articles of Confederation under which they lived for seven years. The American Constitution was written in 1787 "to form a more perfect Union," and was ratified in 1788. Two years later the Bill of Rights was added. 9 More than any other constitution, the American constitution is characterized by the principle of separation of powers. Not unlike Montesquieu, Madison thought that " (i)n framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."
According to Madison, those precautions can only be taken "by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places."
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In the American constitution those grand ideas about separation of powers were given a much more concrete form than Montesquieu could have dreamed. Article I, Section 1, provides that all legislative powers "shall be vested in a Congress which shall consist of a 10 The Federalist no. 51, reproduced in Geoffrey R. Stone, et al., n. 8 above, 15-17. 11 But see Section 7 (2) with regard to the 'veto'-power of the President, which authorizes him to ask Congress to reconsider a law presented for his signature. 12 The President and Vice President, after being nominated as candidates by their party's convention, are elected on a ticket by Electors designated in accordance with Article II, section 1 (2) -(4) of the Constitution and Amendment XII (1804). Each State appoints Electors, who then vote for the candidate who obtains the most votes in their State ('winner takes all'). The election of the President therefore comes very close to a direct election by universal suffrage. 13 The American Constitution itself has only seven Articles. Besides those mentioned in the text, Article IV contains the "full faith and credit" clause that requires States to enforce judgments and laws of the other states. Article V concerns the power of Congress to propose amendments to the Constitution, and Articles VI and VII concern the implementation and ratification of the Constitution. 14 The coup took place on May 13, 1958 and resulted in the institution of a Comité de salut public which was largely dominated by the military and which asked General de Gaulle to take power. order to obtain Parliament's approval of his candidate. Even then, though, the President still has a great deal of influence, particularly over matters of national defence and foreign affairs, which are the so-called "privileged" powers of the President.
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The American constitutional system shares common threads with the French constitutional systems. Both the American and the French systems have a president elected by universal suffrage, which bestows legitimacy on the elected leader and prevents Congress or Parliament from forcing him or her to resign. The American constitutional system shares also common threads with the German constitutional system. They both establish a federal state and therefore divide powers between the federal government and those of the states. They have both a constitutional court, which is charged with deciding cases in which conflicts of power 17 The amendment, approved by a referendum in accordance with Article 11 of the Constitution, was promulgated by constitutional law of November 6, 1962 amending Article 7 of the Constitution: see Favoreu et al., supra n. 14, 558. By granting popular legitimacy to the Presidency, the amendment changed the physiognomy of the Constitution significantly. Many other revisions of the Constitution have been effected since, though in accordance with the regular procedure of Article 89 of the Constitution: ibid., at 655-657. As a result of the 1962 amendment, the President is now directly elected by the people, in two rounds, for renewable periods of five years. 18 For a description of how the French system came into existence and how it evolved in the years thereafter, see Ezra N. arise between the federal and the state levels. As for the American and the British systems, they have, at first glance, little in common -which is not surprising, given that the American Constitution was ordained in reaction to the British Parliament and Monarchy. The British system is a parliamentary (not a presidential) regime; it is a unitary (rather than federal) state with a monarch at the top. It has no written constitution, nor a constitutional court. Actually, on most of these points, the British system differs from both the French and German systems as well.
If one looks at political realities though, the American and the British systems share one characteristic that the American, French, and German systems do not share -both are (basically) two-party political systems. 20 Characteristic of such a system is, that it provides the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, as the effective leader of the winning political party in the most recent election, with almost the same lasting political support that a popularly elected president, like the American, enjoys during his or her tenure in office. Both can rely on a majority in Parliament or Congress to push legislation through -even though, theoretically, in the United Kingdom the Prime Minister can be forced to step down, however only when he loses control of "his" or "her" political party. Characteristic of a two-party system is also that it leads to a "one-party government." By contrast, in countries with a 'multi-party' system, like Germany, Italy, Belgium or the Netherlands, even the largest party will normally need the support of at least one other party to form a "coalition government," which will make the position of the Chancellor or Prime Minister less powerful than in the case of a "one-party government" and also less stable -even when it requires a constructive vote of no confidence to replace him or her, as in Germany or Belgium.
C. Different Forms of Executive federalism.
The foregoing description concerned the horizontal division of powers, i.e., the division of power between the legislature and the executive. In parliamentary systems, only the first enjoys 20 To call the British system (or the American system for that matter) a two party system is somewhat deceiving since, in the post-war period, a variety of parties other than the two predominant parties have participated in The author observes that a two-party system failed to take root on the European continent, because of the existence there of many societal differences and the resulting lack of a polarizing and simplifying issue. the highest form of democratic legitimisation through universal elections. In a presidential system, both (one chambers or both chambers of) the legislature and the executive enjoy such highest form of legitimisation through universal elections. Moreover, in a federal state public power is also vertically divided, that is between the federal and the state level -which holds true for both forms of federalism: integrative and devolutive federalism. The first refers to federalism resulting from the bringing or growing together of formerly independent countries or regions, as the U.S., Switzerland and Germany; the second refers to the splitting of what was before a unitary state into a federal state, as in Belgium or Canada, but also Spain and even the U.K. The distinction is not always clear-cut: many unitary states, such as the U.K., witness a slow process of devolution which, sooner or later, may or may not result into a federal state.
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In a devolutionary kind of federalism, it is predictable that the separation between the two levels will be more messy than in the case of integrative form of federalism. In the former the devolution will mostly take place gradually and as a result of a lot of bargaining whereby the federal level will try to remain as long, or as much, unitary as possible -which, in the end, is of course a matter of where most of the power of the purse (taxation) goes to: remaining with the federal level or being transferred together with large areas of competences to the regions.
In the latter, the process will be the reverse: the formally independent countries or regions will first transfer certain areas of competence and will later on, often reluctantly, be convinced to transfer additional areas and financial resources to the federal level. The EU belongs obviously to the integrative kind of federalism, albeit in rather slow motion.
One of the aspects of vertical division of power is the way in which federal legislation is implemented in the countries or regions of the federation. 22 The American and German The statement requires some explanation as to the way in which presidential and parliamentary regimes are characterized. 29 The presidential system is a system of "dual democratic legitimacy," since both the president and the legislature are elected by the people.
Both are elected for a fixed term during which their survival is independent from each other:
this leads to "rigidity" and "mutual independence." In a parliamentary system, only the legislature is elected by the people, as the chief executive must be supported by a majority in the legislature. The executive can fall if it receives a vote of no confidence from the parliament, while the head of government has the capacity, normally in conjunction with the head of state, to dissolve the legislature and call for elections. As a result, a parliamentary system is characterized as having "single democratic legitimacy," "less rigidity" and "mutual dependence,"
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The drawbacks of the presidential regime follow from the above characteristics. "Dual legitimacy" implies that a president elected by a majority, sometimes a plurality only, 31 enjoys the same democratic authority as elected legislators, even though the latter represent a variety of political choices that were submitted to the electorate as alternatives by the political parties to which they belong; they are therefore better qualified to represent the people as a whole. 32 Most importantly, when a conflict between these two equally legitimated actors comes to loggerheads, there are in a presidential system no deadlockbreaking devices, because of their "mutual independence." In unstable democracies this "rigidity" may lead to a propensity for military coups.
Another and related drawback of the presidential system is its "ambiguity," in that the office of elected president is acting as a head of state (and not just government) and is therefore expected to represent the whole people, internally and externally. However, in situations of 28 Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?" : ibid., n. 18 above, 3-87, at 4. Indeed, in the words of Stepan and Skach, "numerous different sources of data … point in the direction of a much stronger correlation between democratic consolidation and pure parliamentarism than between consolidation and pure presidentialism" : Stepan & Skach, n. 27 above, 120. 29 The terms quoted in the following sentences are from Linz' article, n. the nation in a non-partisan way -a role that allows the latter to give discrete counselling to the former with a view to moderating extreme positions, but can also take a more decisive form in exceptional circumstances.
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By contrast, one of the presumed advantages of "mutual independence" inherent in a presidential system is that it assures the stability of the executive, as compared with the alleged instability of a parliamentary regime. This weakness of parliamentary systems, however, can easily be overcome by providing in a "constructive vote of no-confidence," as explained previously. 36 Moreover, in a presidential system, the price for stability is a higher degree of "rigidity" and "unaccountability": a leader who has lost the confidence of his own party or constituency cannot be replaced by someone better able to deal with the situation, or more attractive to the persons who have lost confidence. In the same way, such a leader cannot be held to account -especially when he cannot be re-elected at the end of his term.
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Another presumed advantage of a presidential system is that the voter knows the person he or she is voting for. However, that knowledge, and the voters' preference for one presidential candidate or another, may be very superficial as it will often be the result of "videopolitics," 33 The term is from Arthur Schlesinger's work The Imperial Presidency, 1973, in which the author maintains that over time, mainly in matters of foreign policy, the power of the U.S President grew tremendously, an evolution which culminated with, and was exposed by, Richard Nixon and the Watergate Affair. See the excerpt from Schlesinger's book in The Lanahan Readings in the American Polity, third ed.
(Ann G. Serow and Everett C. Ladd, eds.), at 221-228. 34 See further, Linz, n. 28 above, 24-26; also 46-47. 35 In such circumstances, a head of state may have the constitutional power to refuse the signing of a controversial act, as happened recently when the Italian President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi refused to sign into law a bill that he believed would reinforce the overwhelming dominance of PM Berlusconi's mighty media empire. See The Economist, January 17-23, 2004, at 41. 36 The device was first applied in Germany in reaction to the short-lived governments under the Weimar Republic.
On the instability of that Republic which lasted from 1918 to 1933, see C. Allen on Germany in Kesselman & Krieger, n. 3 above, at 251-253. 37 Linz, n. 28 above, 9-10 and, on the implications of no re-election, 16-18.
(i.e. of good looks and sound bites). 38 Moreover, also in a parliamentary system, the voter will mostly know whom he is voting as, most of the time, it will be the leader of the party winning the election who will become the new prime minister. More importantly, in a parliamentary regime the voter may know the candidate less but will better know the political program for which he or she is voting, and leaves the choice as to who will implement the program to the party he or she has voted for.
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Summing up the discussion Stepan and Skach conclude that parliamentarism has a more supportive constitutional framework because of its "greater propensity for governments to have majorities to implement their programs, and its greater ability to rule in a multiparty setting," because of its "lower propensity for executives to rule at the edge of the constitution and its greater facility at removing a chief executive who does so, …", and because of its "greater tendency to provide long party or government careers, which add loyalty and experience to political society." 40 To be sure, the arguments against presidentialism may be based too much on broad distinctions to be true for all purposes, but they have not generally been refuted. 41 The question remains, however, of whether "pure" presidentialism, American style, cannot be improved by a "mixed" form of presidentialism, French style.
42
The difference between pure and mixed (or semi-) presidentialism has been drawn by political scientist Giovanni Sartori who, in an article pointedly entitled "Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism," 43 defines "pure" presidentialism by three criteria: (i) a popularly-elected chief executive; (ii) who can only be discharged under very special 38 Thus Giovanni Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism," in The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Linz and Venezuala, eds), Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1994, 106-118. 39 Linz, n. 28 above, 10-11. The difference has been characterized by Yale professor Bruce Ackerman in the following terms: " … the cult of presidential personality goes against the grain of republican self-government. It is downright embarrassing for a constitution to ask free and equal citizens to place so much trust in the personal integrity and ideals of a single human being. Far better for the constitution to encourage citizens to engage in a politics of principle -debating which of the existing political parties best expresses their collective ideals …": Bruce Ackerman in "The New Separation of Powers," Assembly. 45 Depending on the circumstances, the French system can be more or less presidential. In circumstances of "non-cohabitation," that is when the President and the Prime Minister are supported by the same political majority, the President dominates the political scene, and the system is therefore more presidential. By contrast, the system is less presidential in case of "co-habitation", i.e. when the President and the Prime Minister are supported by disparate political majorities. In such a situation, the Prime Minister can rely on a majority in Parliament which supports him or her, but which does not support the President.
In this situation the system has more in common with a parliamentary system.
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It follows from this description that a semi-presidential system has the same drawbacks as a presidential system. Those are: dual legitimacy, independence of the presidency from the elected legislature and rigidity in the sense that there are no deadlock-breaking devices when dual legitimacy leads to a lasting conflict between the presidency and parliament -with one notable exception though, which is stipulated in favour of the President, that is that, once a year, the president can dissolve parliament and call new parliamentary elections. Precisely because of this exception, the President will in the French system be seen also, as in a pure presidential system, as a partisan head of State.
47
B. Assessing pure and mixed parliamentarism. 44 Favoreu et al., n. 14 above, 562-563. 45 Id. , at 564. 46 See further Ezra N. Suleiman, "Presidentialism and Political Stability in France," in The Failure of Presidential Democracy, n. 18 above, 136-163. 47 In addition to these drawbacks which the French system shares with pure presidential systems, there are other reasons for the French system not to be emulated. Those are that the system consists of a series of overlapping relationships: not only between the president, the prime minister and the parliamentary majority, but also between the executive and wider state structures, such as the judiciary and independent administrative regulatory agencies, between the political elite and the people, and between France and Europe. Robert Elgie, "France" in the work cited in n. 42 above.
Parliamentarism in its purest form is a system that lost its appeal with the French Third (1870-1940) and Fourth (1946 Fourth ( -1958 Republics and with the German Weimar Republic (1918) (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) . 48 It refers to a so-called "assembly-driven" system in which parliament wants or tries to make important decisions itself and is unwilling or incapable to give political backing to the executive, thus preventing the latter from running the country. As such, the system is totally inept to govern a modern state. 49 To be sure, most often the situation does not arise because parliament insists on using its sovereign power but because it is too much divided as a result of extreme party-proliferation. In such a situation, political parties are too small and too weak to give lasting support to a "coalition government," with the result that the executive, if it does not wish to resign at any occasion, is forced to ask the head of state to dissolve parliament and to call new elections. If these elections are inconclusive, this may lead to even more instability, as happened in the last months of the Weimar Republic during which no fewer than six elections were held, all resulting in minority governments.
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In recent times, pure parliamentarism has therefore been replaced by one or another form of "mixed" parliamentarism. In that respect, Giovanni Sartori makes a distinction between three different kinds of parliamentarism hinging on the strength of the position of the head of government, Prime Minister or Chancellor. These are: (i) a "first above unequals" head of government; (ii) a "first among unequals" head of government;" and (iii) a "first among equals" head of government. In the case of a "first above unequals", like the Prime Minister in the U.K., the head of government is also the party leader of a one-party government. In such a situation, he or she has a free hand in picking and firing subordinate ministers and, as party leader, cannot him-or herself be easily removed by a parliament that is dominated by the party he or she leads. At the other extreme, in the case of a "first among equals," like the Belgian Prime Minister before 1993, the head of government is not the leader of the ruling political party which makes him or her, when governmental crises occur, along, and on a par, with the other cabinet ministers, dependent on compromises worked out by party secretaries and faction leaders; when no compromise is found, these party leaders agree to oust government and call new I will now examine, in light of the foregoing analysis, which governmental structure the European Union should adopt. The answer is neither a pure nor a semi-presidential system, but a strong -though not majoritarian but consensus -parliamentary system, that is, a system in which the executive is fully answerable to the elected parliament.
It will be clear, from the outset, that the Union's decision-making process is unlikely to result in a presidential system for the Union, and that there is no reason why it should.
There are two reasons supporting the first part of that proposition: (i) among the twentyfive 25 Member States, only Cyprus has a pure presidential system while only France has a truly semi-presidential system; and (ii) the present political system of the Union already has more parliamentary features than presidential ones, and the draft Constitution would add some more. As for the second part of the proposition, i.e. that the Union should not adopt a presidential system, the foregoing discussion has not shown that a presidential system is superior to a parliamentary system. I will briefly deal with each of these elements.
A. Rejecting (pure and semi-) Presidentialism for the Union. given that the system would still have to prove its value in surroundings that are completely different from those prevailing in the United States. Though the presidential system certainly works well in the United States, it is a system that is difficult to define, let alone to imitate, 61 certainly in a Union which has not the cohesion and the allegiance from its peoples as the United States do enjoy after more than two centuries of existence.
Moreover, the election of a president by popular vote, would seem to be operational only in a bipartisan system where the elected president can, to maintain his popularity while in office, rely on a (quasi-) majority of voters. In a multi-party system as the one prevailing in the Union the president's popularity would depend on a consensus between political parties that represent only a fraction of the population. 61 See for example Richard Neustadt's book Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, 1990, in which it is argued that the President's real power comes not from the Constitution nor from formal authority, but rather from the authority to persuade others; and the book of Arthur Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, 1973, who argues that the power of the presidency has grown tremendously over the years, and that Americans must remain on guard in the future, even although the "imperial presidency" was exposed with Richard Nixon. For excerpts, see American Polity (Ann G. Serow & Everett C. Ladd, eds.), third ed., Lanahan Publishers, Inc., Baltimore, at 217-228.
The Union should also not adopt a semi-presidential system modelled on the French imply a serious curtailment in the powers of the European Parliament and, therefore, increase the Union's "democratic deficit." Both these features make the French system unsuitable to a system like that of the European Union, which needs a strong executive to effectuate its integration project, and a strong parliament to enhance its democratic legitimacy.
B. How to construct a parliamentary system for the Union?
1. A consensus democracy.
Having reached the conclusion that the Union should have a parliamentary system, the question is, then, which form of parliamentarism the Union should adopt. Here also, the current state of the Union shows the way, the Union having already several distinctive characteristics of a consensus democracy. As pointed out by political scientist Arend Lijphart, 63 consensus is sought after at various levels (i) in the Union's executive, the Commission, which is comparable to a cabinet, where a broad inter-nation and inter-party coalition is based on consensus; (ii) with regard to the executive-legislative balance of power, the Commission is an equal partner in the relationship between the three EU institutions (Commission, Parliament and Council), rather than to be subordinate to the European Parliament, thus being an equal party in the inter-institutional dialogue; (iii) the Union has a multi-party system with a large number of political parties represented in Defining the Union as a consensus democracy does not only correspond to the current state of the Union, it is also desirable that the Union be one, and remain one given the large cultural, linguistic, political and sociological differences that exist in a Union of twenty-five Member States. In such a Union, a consensus democracy based on an electoral system of proportional representation, is the only system that permits the involvement of large segments of the population in the Union's decision making process. Which is why the United Kingdom which for internal purposes applies a majoritarian system on the basis of a "winner-take-all" electoral system, has agreed to apply proportional representation in elections for the European parliament.
With a strong leadership
The fact that the Union takes the form of a consensus democracy should not prevent it from having a strong executive. Consensus democracies have not been proven to be less decisive policy makers than majoritarian democracies. 
C. Enhancing the EU Commission's political accountability and recasting the role of Europarties.
From a perspective of political accountability, the current system would seem to have three The most crucial function of political parties is to recruit party members and party representatives to stand as a candidate in one of many local, regional, national or European public elections, and to take part in the formation of governments at each of these levels (with the exception, so far, of the European level). More specifically, at the national level, party leaders will de facto select the Prime Minister, approve his or her choice of cabinet ministers, and maintain his/her position, and that of the cabinet, in office. This is so, because it is normally the leader of the political party that prevailed in the last parliamentary election, who will be asked by the head of state to form a new government, and who will often become the head of government, if he or she succeeds in forming a team. 70 Because in a multi-party political system (as most European countries are) not even the largest political party will normally have enough seats to secure a majority in parliament, the party leader asked to form the government will want to have Obviously, the actual number of votes which these "pan-European"
candidates would have assembled behind their name in the national constituencies, would have an impact on the party's final decision as to whom they will put forward as a candidate for the Commission presidency and membership.
All that is not enough though: in order to be attractive for citizens, it will be necessary for the Euro-parties to associate themselves with clear issue dimensions that reflect major citizen preferences. Currently, the Euro-parties act mainly as conglomerates of national parties with insufficient party-identity and little party-autonomy. In order to involve citizens, they will need to identify themselves with distinctive, and divisive, issues around which large citizen groups can be assembled. The most prominent issues which may assemble citizens at the European level, are: the "socio-economic" dimension, the "integration versus inter-governmental" dimension, the "cultural-ethnic/linguistic" dimension, and the "pro-environment and basic citizen participation" dimension. There is no reason why these issues would not lead also to the emergence of strong and cohesive political parties at Union level. They could lead for example to two large parties, one centre/left and one centre/right party, both committed to (moderate) European integration but each with a different emphasis (not a split) on social versus marketorientation, and to a number of smaller parties, such as a conservative party strongly committed to the nation state and to cultural (including religious) identity, a leftist party committed to anti-globalism, and a green party committed to broad environmental issues with a strong emphasis on citizen participation. On the basis of the current composition of the European Parliament, both the centre/left and the centre/right parties would be able to form coalitions, if not with each other, than -the former -with the leftist party and/or (presumably) the green party, or -the latter -with the conservative and/or (possibly) the green party.
D. Constructing political accountability in the Council of Ministers -and in committees of
Member State officials and regulators operating at the European level. Council of Ministers will be regarded in the future, more particularly, whether it is seen to become, in the (very) long run, one of two houses of parliament in a bicameral system.
In that respect, a comparison with the German situation may be instructive, because of the federal structure of the German Republic in which, like in the Union (supra -), there is a place to be allocated to both the People of the Republic and the component parts, the None of these solutions would have been, or is, consistent with the choice of a parliamentary system as advocated hereinbefore.
The solution to be retained therefore, in line with the current situation, is to have a Council President elected by his peers with the power to drive the Union forward but without legislative or executive competences, therefore having more than purely ceremonial powers but having, instead, the prestige and moral authority to facilitate cohesion and arbitrate differences, and to represent the Union in its international relations.
To Conclude.
The answer to the question raised at the outset which was to know what governmental structure the European should adopt in the future, is that neither a pure nor a semi-presidential system is to be recommended but rather a strong parliamentary system with an executive, the European Commission, whose democratic legitimacy is rooted in citizen involvement through 
